Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Basar, Merouane Debbah, Are Hj{\o}rungnes

TL;DR
This paper models collaborative spectrum sensing as a coalitional game, proposing distributed algorithms for coalition formation that optimize detection performance and stability, significantly reducing miss probabilities while maintaining false alarm rates.
Contribution
It introduces novel distributed coalition formation algorithms for CSS, including a voting-based approach for guaranteed detection probabilities, with proven properties and stability analysis.
Findings
CF reduces miss probability by up to 88.45%
CF-PD achieves required detection probability for up to 87.25% of SUs
Algorithms maintain false alarm rates while optimizing detection performance
Abstract
Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation (CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition…
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