Evolutionary game theory in growing populations
Anna Melbinger, Jonas Cremer, Erwin Frey

TL;DR
This paper introduces a stochastic model combining population growth and evolutionary dynamics, revealing how randomness can transiently promote cooperation in growing populations.
Contribution
It presents a novel integrated model of population growth and evolution, highlighting the impact of stochastic events on cooperation dynamics.
Findings
Stochastic events can transiently increase cooperation.
Growth dynamics influence evolutionary outcomes.
The model captures coupled growth and evolution processes.
Abstract
Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model which combines the growth dynamics of the population and its internal evolution. Our model thereby accounts for the fact that both evolutionary and growth dynamics are based on individual reproduction events and hence are highly coupled and stochastic in nature. We exemplify our approach by studying the dilemma of cooperation in growing populations and show that genuinely stochastic events can ease the dilemma by leading to a transient but robust increase in cooperation
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