Inner Product Spaces for MinSum Coordination Mechanisms

TL;DR

This paper introduces new coordination policies for selfish scheduling on unrelated machines, achieving improved approximation ratios and ensuring the existence of pure Nash equilibria through potential game design.

Contribution

It develops novel local policies with tight approximation bounds for minimizing weighted completion times, and proves the existence of pure Nash equilibria in these settings.

Findings

Smith's Rule achieves a 4-approximation, optimal among deterministic policies.

ProportionalSharing achieves a 2.618-approximation, tight for preemptive policies.

Rand policy achieves a 2.13-approximation and guarantees pure Nash equilibria.

Abstract

We study policies aiming to minimize the weighted sum of completion times of jobs in the context of coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling problems. Our goal is to design local policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the resulting equilibria for unrelated machine scheduling. To obtain the approximation bounds, we introduce a new technique that while conceptually simple, seems to be quite powerful. With this method we are able to prove the following results. First, we consider Smith's Rule, which orders the jobs on a machine in ascending processing time to weight ratio, and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of 4. We also demonstrate that this is the best possible for deterministic non-preemptive strongly local policies. Since Smith's Rule is always optimal for a given assignment, this may seem unsurprising, but we then show that better approximation ratios can be obtained if either preemption or randomization is allowed. We prove that ProportionalSharing, a preemptive strongly local policy, achieves an approximation ratio of 2.618 for the weighted sum of completion times, and an approximation ratio of 2.5 in the unweighted case. Again, we observe that these bounds are tight. Next, we consider Rand, a natural non-preemptive but randomized policy. We show that it achieves an approximation ratio of at most 2.13; moreover, if the sum of the weighted completion times is negligible compared to the cost of the optimal solution, this improves to \pi /2. Finally, we show that both ProportionalSharing and Rand induce potential games, and thus always have a pure Nash equilibrium (unlike Smith's Rule). This also allows us to design the first \emph{combinatorial} constant-factor approximation algorithm minimizing weighted completion time for unrelated machine scheduling that achieves a factor of 2+ \epsilon for any \epsilon > 0.