A Fault Analytic Method against HB+

TL;DR

This paper introduces a fault analysis method targeting the HB+ lightweight RFID authentication protocol, revealing a new vulnerability that threatens the security of HB-like protocols in low-cost RFID systems.

Contribution

It presents the first fault analytic approach against HB+ protocols, demonstrating a practical attack and highlighting security concerns in lightweight RFID authentication.

Findings

Fault analysis can effectively compromise HB+ protocol security

The attack demonstrates a serious threat to HB-like protocols

The method is flexible and adaptable to similar protocols

Abstract

The search for lightweight authentication protocols suitable for low-cost RFID tags constitutes an active and challenging research area. In this context, a family of protocols based on the LPN problem has been proposed: the so-called HB-family. Despite the rich literature regarding the cryptanalysis of these protocols, there are no published results about the impact of fault analysis over them. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by presenting a fault analytic method against a prominent member of the HB-family: HB+ protocol. We demonstrate that the fault analysis model can lead to a flexible and effective attack against HB-like protocols, posing a serious threat over them.