Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that the detector blinding attack on quantum cryptography is largely ineffective on properly operated single photon avalanche photodiodes, especially when certain hardware configurations are avoided.

Contribution

It identifies specific conditions and configurations under which the detector blinding attack can be prevented in quantum cryptography systems.

Findings

Most APDs are resistant to the attack when operated correctly.

The attack requires a redundant resistor or improper discrimination levels.

Proper detector operation mitigates the attack's effectiveness.

Abstract

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately.