Detection of Anomalous Reactor Activity Using Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution Over the Course of a Reactor Cycle

TL;DR

This study presents a statistical method using antineutrino count rate measurements to detect unauthorized removal of plutonium from reactors, enhancing nuclear safeguards with quantifiable sensitivity.

Contribution

It introduces a hypothesis testing approach to identify significant deviations in antineutrino signals indicating fuel anomalies, improving reactor safeguard techniques.

Findings

Detects 73 kg plutonium removal in 90 days with 95% probability

Controls false positive rate at 5%

Identifies necessary antineutrino count rate for detection

Abstract

This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino count rate measurements to changes in the fissile content of civil power reactors. Such measurements may be useful in IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce a hypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically significant differences between the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard 'baseline' fuel cycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which plutonium is removed and replaced with an equivalent fissile worth of uranium. The test would allow an inspector to detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that the reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuel inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice of detector parameters, the test can detect replacement of 73 kg of plutonium in 90 days with 95% probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%. We show that some improvement on this level of sensitivity may be expected by various means, including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactor safeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient daily antineutrino count rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity, and list examples of detectors in which such rates have been attained.