Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Commuting Measurements

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that secure device-independent quantum key distribution is achievable when honest parties' measurements commute, even without trusting their quantum devices, thus enhancing security against general quantum attacks.

Contribution

It introduces a new security proof for device-independent QKD based on commuting measurements, broadening the scope of secure quantum communication.

Findings

Secure key distribution is possible with commuting measurements.

The security holds against the most general quantum attacks.

The approach relaxes assumptions on the quantum devices used.

Abstract

We consider quantum key distribution in the device-independent scenario, i.e., where the legitimate parties do not know (or trust) the exact specification of their apparatus. We show how secure key distribution can be realized against the most general attacks by a quantum adversary under the condition that measurements on different subsystems by the honest parties commute.