A Game Theoretical Approach to Modeling Full-Duplex Information Dissemination

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game theoretical model to analyze how individuals in social networks decide to share and feedback on information, considering personal traits and network effects, explaining social network emergence.

Contribution

It presents a novel game theoretical framework modeling two-way information dissemination with feedback, incorporating personality and network factors.

Findings

Model explains social network emergence through utility maximization.

Highlights role of personality traits in information sharing decisions.

Provides insights into feedback mechanisms in social networks.

Abstract

One major function of social networks (e.g., massive online social networks) is the dissemination of information such as scientific knowledge, news, and rumors. Information can be propagated by the users of the network via natural connections in written, oral or electronic form. The information passing from a sender to a receiver intrinsically involves both of them considering their self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity, which further determine their decisions of whether or not to forward the information and whether or not to provide feedback. To understand such human aspects of the information dissemination, we propose a game theoretical model of the two-way full duplex information forwarding and feedback mechanisms in a social network that take into account the personalities of the communicating actors (including their perceived knowledgeability, reputation, and desire for popularity) and the global characteristics of the network. The model demonstrates how the emergence of social networks can be explained in terms of maximizing game theoretical utility.