A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

TL;DR
This paper introduces a direct reduction method from k-player to 2-player games for approximate Nash equilibrium, simplifying previous complex reductions and avoiding the PPAD complexity class framework.
Contribution
It provides the first direct reduction from k-player to 2-player approximate Nash equilibrium, removing reliance on PPAD-based indirect reductions.
Findings
Simplifies the reduction process between k-player and 2-player games
Eliminates the need for PPAD complexity class framework
Facilitates easier analysis of approximate Nash equilibria
Abstract
We present a direct reduction from k-player games to 2-player games that preserves approximate Nash equilibrium. Previously, the computational equivalence of computing approximate Nash equilibrium in k-player and 2-player games was established via an indirect reduction. This included a sequence of works defining the complexity class PPAD, identifying complete problems for this class, showing that computing approximate Nash equilibrium for k-player games is in PPAD, and reducing a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, thus eliminating some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction.
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