Local search for stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists
Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca RossI, Kristen Brent, Venable, Toby Walsh

TL;DR
This paper introduces a local search method to efficiently find large stable matchings in the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists, addressing an NP-hard optimization challenge.
Contribution
It presents a novel local search approach tailored for the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists, enabling large-scale solutions efficiently.
Findings
Successfully solves large problem instances quickly
Achieves large and often optimal stable matchings
Reduces neighborhood size for efficient local moves
Abstract
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the stable marriage problem, where the men and women express their preferences using a preference list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these preference lists. In this setting, we study the problem of finding a stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Stability is an envy-free notion: no man and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to their partners or to being single. This problem is NP-hard. We tackle this problem using local search, exploiting properties of the problem to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
