A Game Theoretical Analysis of Localization Security in Wireless Sensor Networks with Adversaries
Nicola Gatti, Mattia Monga, Sabrina Sicari

TL;DR
This paper uses game theory to analyze the security of node localization in wireless sensor networks, demonstrating that Verifiable Multilateration effectively reduces malicious node impersonation.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic model to evaluate localization security strategies, showing VM's effectiveness against adversarial attacks.
Findings
VM reduces fake position success rate
Optimal strategies for defenders and attackers identified
Game-theoretic approach clarifies security trade-offs
Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) support data collection and distributed data processing by means of very small sensing devices that are easy to tamper and cloning: therefore classical security solutions based on access control and strong authentication are difficult to deploy. In this paper we look at the problem of assessing security of node localization. In particular, we analyze the scenario in which Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is used to localize nodes and a malicious node (i.e., the adversary) try to masquerade as non-malicious. We resort to non-cooperative game theory and we model this scenario as a two-player game. We analyze the optimal players' strategy and we show that the VM is indeed a proper mechanism to reduce fake positions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity in Wireless Sensor Networks · Distributed Control Multi-Agent Systems · Guidance and Control Systems
