A Game Theoretical Analysis of Localization Security in Wireless Sensor Networks with Adversaries

TL;DR

This paper uses game theory to analyze the security of node localization in wireless sensor networks, demonstrating that Verifiable Multilateration effectively reduces malicious node impersonation.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic model to evaluate localization security strategies, showing VM's effectiveness against adversarial attacks.

Findings

VM reduces fake position success rate

Optimal strategies for defenders and attackers identified

Game-theoretic approach clarifies security trade-offs

Abstract

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) support data collection and distributed data processing by means of very small sensing devices that are easy to tamper and cloning: therefore classical security solutions based on access control and strong authentication are difficult to deploy. In this paper we look at the problem of assessing security of node localization. In particular, we analyze the scenario in which Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is used to localize nodes and a malicious node (i.e., the adversary) try to masquerade as non-malicious. We resort to non-cooperative game theory and we model this scenario as a two-player game. We analyze the optimal players' strategy and we show that the VM is indeed a proper mechanism to reduce fake positions.