Dilemma game in a traffic model with the crossing

TL;DR

This study models non-signalized traffic intersections using game theory and the NaSch model, analyzing driver behaviors and phase states to understand traffic flow and energy dissipation.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for traffic intersections, revealing phase diagrams and driver dilemmas in a NaSch-based model.

Findings

Identification of distinct traffic phases including free-flow, segregation, and jammed states.

Observation of a driver dilemma game at the segregated phase.

Analysis of social maximum payoff and energy dissipation patterns.

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the non-signalized intersection issue considering traffic flow and energy dissipation in terms of game theory based on the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model. There are two types of driver agents at the intersection when vehicles on the two streets are approaching to it simultaneously: C agents (cooperative strategy) pulling up to avoid collision and D agents (defective strategy) crossing the intersection audaciously. Phase diagram of the system, which describes free-flow phase, segregation phase, jammed phase and maximum current curve representing the social maximum payoff, is presented. Dilemma game is observed at the phase-segregated state except for the case of $v_{\max }=1.$