Security of high speed quantum key distribution with finite detector dead time

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the security of high-speed quantum key distribution systems considering finite detector dead time, revealing vulnerabilities in existing protocols and proposing secure sifting schemes to optimize key rates under active eavesdropping scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces and compares new secure sifting schemes that account for detector dead time and active eavesdroppers, extending security analysis to decoy state protocols.

Findings

Rogers et al.'s protocol is insecure with active eavesdroppers.

Maximum key rate is 1/(2τ) with passive basis selection.

Maximum key rate is 1/τ with active basis selection.

Abstract

The security of a high speed quantum key distribution system with finite detector dead time \tau is analyzed. When the transmission rate becomes higher than the maximum count rate of the individual detectors (1/\tau ), security issues affect the algorithm for sifting bits. Analytical calculations and numerical simulations of the Bennett-Brassard BB84 protocol are performed. We study Rogers et al.'s protocol (introduced in "Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution," New J. Phys. 9 (2007) 319) in the presence of an active eavesdropper Eve who has the power to perform an intercept-resend attack. It is shown that Rogers et al.'s protocol is no longer secure. More specifically, Eve can induce a basis-dependent detection efficiency at the receiver's end. Modified key sifting schemes that are secure in the presence of dead time and an active eavesdropper are then introduced. We analyze and compare these secure sifting schemes for this active Eve scenario, and calculate and simulate their key generation rate. It is shown that the maximum key generation rate is 1/(2\tau ) for passive basis selection, and 1/\tau for active basis selection. The security analysis for finite detector dead time is also extended to the decoy state BB84 protocol.