Indian policeman's dilemma: A game theoretic model

TL;DR

This paper models the internal conflict of an Indian police officer using a game theoretic approach, splitting the personality into modules with probabilistic payoffs to analyze opposing behaviors.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game model that represents internal conflict through modular players with uncertain payoffs, highlighting the need for new data collection.

Findings

Identifies two Nash equilibria representing opposing behaviors.

Uses probabilistic inequalities to estimate behavior propensities.

Proposes a survey design to measure police professionalism.

Abstract

This paper focuses on a one person game called Indian policeman's dilemma (IPD). It represents the internal conflict between emotion and profession of a typical Indian police officer. We have 'split' the game to be played independently by different personality modules of the same player. Each module then appears as an independent individual player of the game. None of the players knows the exact payoff values of any of the others. Only greater than or less than type of inequalities among the payoff values across the players are to be inferred probabilistically. There are two Nash equilibrium (NE) points in this game signifying two completely opposing behavior by the policeman involved. With the help of the probabilistic inequalities probable propensities of the different behaviors have been determined. The model underscores the need for new surveys and data generation. A design of one such survey to measure professionalism of the police personnel has been outlined.