Do the right thing

TL;DR

This paper models opinion formation in scenarios where individuals choose to either respect or ignore norms, analyzing the minimum support needed for consensus on law abidance through imitation dynamics.

Contribution

It introduces a model of opinion dynamics with non-equivalent opinions and determines the critical support threshold for achieving consensus on law adherence.

Findings

Identifies the minimum percentage of supporters needed for consensus.

Shows how social context influences opinion dynamics.

Provides insights into norm enforcement mechanisms.

Abstract

We study a model of opinion formation where the opinions in conflict are not equivalent. This is the case when the subject of the decision is to respect a norm or a law. In such scenarios, one of the possible behaviors is to abide by the norm and the other to ignore it. The evolution of the dynamics is implemented through an imitation mechanism, in which agents can change their opinions based on the opinions of a set of partners and their own state. We determine, for different social situations, the minimum percentage of supporters of the law necessary to arrive at a state of consensus of law abiders.