Beyond deficit-based models of learners' cognition: Interpreting engineering students' difficulties with sense-making in terms of fine-grained epistemological and conceptual dynamics

TL;DR

This study challenges deficit-based models by showing that engineering students' difficulties in sense-making are rooted in epistemological beliefs, emphasizing the importance of understanding students' views on knowledge to support their learning.

Contribution

The paper introduces a nuanced approach that incorporates multiple epistemological stances into analyzing students' cognitive dynamics, moving beyond deficit models.

Findings

Jim has the necessary knowledge but struggles with translating between math and common sense.

Jim's epistemological views lead him to distrust everyday reasoning compared to mathematical formalism.

Recognizing productive epistemological beliefs can help instructors support students' sense-making.

Abstract

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students' troubles with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology: students' beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder them from activating and integrating productive knowledge they have. In this case study of an engineering major solving problems (about content from his introductory physics course) during a clinical interview, we show that "Jim" has all the mathematical and conceptual knowledge he would need to solve a hydrostatic pressure problem that we posed to him. But he reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We argue that his lack of mathematical sense-making-specifically, translating and reconciling between mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning-stems in part from his epistemological views, i.e., his views about the nature of knowledge and learning. He regards mathematical equations as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and he does not view mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and mathematical formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. We, however, avoid a potential "deficit trap"-substituting an epistemological deficit for a concepts/skills deficit-by incorporating multiple, context-dependent epistemological stances into Jim's cognitive dynamics. We argue that Jim's epistemological stance contains productive seeds that instructors could build upon to support Jim's mathematical sense-making: He does see common-sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so) and in some circumstances this connection is both salient and valued.