Model of an International Environmental Agreement among Asymmetric Nations applied to Debris Mitigation

TL;DR

This paper models how international cooperation among asymmetric nations can improve space debris mitigation, demonstrating that stable coalitions could significantly enhance deorbiting efforts and reduce environmental risks.

Contribution

It combines game theory and orbital debris modeling to analyze the potential benefits of international environmental agreements for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations.

Findings

Stable coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains.

International cooperation can mitigate the tragedy of the commons in space debris.

Simulations suggest potential for effective coalitions among asymmetric nations.

Abstract

We investigate how ideas from the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) literature can be applied to the problem of space debris mitigation. The problem of space debris is similar to other international environmental problems in that there is a potential for a tragedy of the commons effect--individual nations bear all the cost of their mitigation measures but share only a fraction of the benefit. Consequently, nations have a tendency to underinvest in mitigation. Coalitions of nations, brought together by IEAs, have the potential to lessen the tragedy of the commons effect by pooling the costs and benefits of mitigation. This work brings together two recent modeling advances: i) a game theoretic model for studying the potential gains from IEA cooperation between nations with asymmetric costs and benefits, ii) an orbital debris model that gives the societal cost that specific actions, such as failing to deorbit an inactive satellite, have on the environment. We combine these two models with empirical launch share data for a "proof of concept" of an IEA for a single mitigation measure, deorbiting spacecraft at the end of operational lifetime. Simulations of all possible coalitions for a proxy set of 12 asymmetric nations suggest the possibility that stable coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains relative to nations acting in the absence of an IEA coalition.