A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
Nathan Keller

TL;DR
This paper provides a tight, quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, showing that GSWFs close to satisfying IIA and Unanimity are near dictatorships, with a significantly improved bound on the probability of non-transitive outcomes.
Contribution
It establishes a tight bound of imes \, ext{epsilon}^3 for the quantitative version of Arrow's theorem, improving previous exponential bounds and extending to multiple alternatives.
Findings
The imes \, ext{epsilon}^3 bound is tight up to logarithmic factors.
The result applies to GSWFs with any number of alternatives .
The proof combines hypercontractive inequalities with noise correlation analysis.
Abstract
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily non-transitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of the theorem: For any , there exists such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most , then the GSWF is at most -far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition. In 2009, Mossel proved such quantitative version, with , and generalized it to GSWFs with alternatives, for all . In this paper we show that the quantitative version…
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