Signaling games with pattern recognition

TL;DR

This paper explores a new framework for signaling games where the receiver recognizes sender patterns rather than exact types, challenging traditional assumptions and analyzing implications of this relaxation.

Contribution

It introduces a novel signaling game model incorporating pattern recognition, expanding the theoretical understanding of information transmission with less precise receiver discrimination.

Findings

Framework of signaling games with pattern recognition provided

Example illustrating the impact of pattern recognition on signaling strategies

Analysis of how pattern recognition alters equilibrium outcomes

Abstract

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption is questionable. It is more reasonable to let the receiver recognize the pattern of the sender. In this paper, we investigate what happens if the assumption is relaxed. A framework of signaling games with pattern recognition and an example are given.