Breaking and making quantum money: toward a new quantum cryptographic protocol
Andrew Lutomirski, Scott Aaronson, Edward Farhi, David Gosset,, Avinatan Hassidim, Jonathan Kelner, and Peter Shor

TL;DR
This paper explores the security challenges of public-key quantum money, introduces the concept of collision-free protocols, and provides a blueprint and example, highlighting potential vulnerabilities in current schemes.
Contribution
It proposes the first framework for collision-free quantum money protocols and offers a concrete example, advancing understanding of quantum money security.
Findings
Existing public-key quantum money schemes are insecure.
Collision-free protocols prevent the bank from producing identical quantum bills.
The provided example may be insecure, indicating the need for further research.
Abstract
Public-key quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a bank can create quantum states which anyone can verify but no one except possibly the bank can clone or forge. There are no secure public-key quantum money schemes in the literature; as we show in this paper, the only previously published scheme [1] is insecure. We introduce a category of quantum money protocols which we call collision-free. For these protocols, even the bank cannot prepare multiple identical-looking pieces of quantum money. We present a blueprint for how such a protocol might work as well as a concrete example which we believe may be insecure.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture · Quantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata
