Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques
Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Nick Gravin, Fedor Petrov

TL;DR
This paper introduces a spectral technique-based scheme for designing frugal truthful mechanisms in set systems, improving bounds and unifying several known mechanisms while addressing open questions in the field.
Contribution
It proposes a novel spectral scheme for truthful mechanism design applicable to various set systems, providing bounds and optimality results, and unifying existing mechanisms under this framework.
Findings
The scheme applies to vertex cover and k-path systems, with bounds tied to eigenvalues.
The mechanism is optimal for certain vertex cover systems under local sparsity.
For k-path systems, the mechanism is within a factor of k+1 of optimal, and is actually optimal under a modified frugality measure.
Abstract
We study the design of truthful mechanisms for set systems, i.e., scenarios where a customer needs to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. In this setting, frugality [Archer&Tardos'02] provides a measure to evaluate the "cost of truthfulness", that is, the overpayment of a truthful mechanism relative to the "fair" payment. We propose a uniform scheme for designing frugal truthful mechanisms for general set systems. Our scheme is based on scaling the agents' bids using the eigenvector of a matrix that encodes the interdependencies between the agents. We demonstrate that the r-out-of-k-system mechanism and the \sqrt-mechanism for buying a path in a graph [Karlin et. al'05] can be viewed as instantiations of our scheme. We then apply our scheme to two other classes of set systems, namely, vertex cover systems and k-path systems, in which a customer needs to purchase k…
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