Evaluation of Anonymized ONS Queries

TL;DR

This paper evaluates the use of Tor to enhance privacy in EPC-based supply chain systems by analyzing its impact on latency and security in ONS/DNS queries.

Contribution

It provides an experimental comparison of Tor's effectiveness and limitations for anonymizing ONS queries in EPC infrastructure.

Findings

Tor improves query privacy but increases latency.

Limitations include potential performance degradation.

The approach offers a privacy trade-off in supply chain applications.

Abstract

Electronic Product Code (EPC) is the basis of a pervasive infrastructure for the automatic identification of objects on supply chain applications (e.g., pharmaceutical or military applications). This infrastructure relies on the use of the (1) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to tag objects in motion and (2) distributed services providing information about objects via the Internet. A lookup service, called the Object Name Service (ONS) and based on the use of the Domain Name System (DNS), can be publicly accessed by EPC applications looking for information associated with tagged objects. Privacy issues may affect corporate infrastructures based on EPC technologies if their lookup service is not properly protected. A possible solution to mitigate these issues is the use of online anonymity. We present an evaluation experiment that compares the of use of Tor (The second generation Onion Router) on a global ONS/DNS setup, with respect to benefits, limitations, and latency.