Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Eilon Solan

TL;DR
This paper proves that in two-player non-zero-sum Borel games with lower-semi-continuous payoffs, a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium always exists, highlighting the importance of payoff continuity conditions.
Contribution
It establishes the existence of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria in Borel games under lower-semi-continuous payoffs, extending prior results and clarifying conditions for equilibrium existence.
Findings
Existence of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium under lower-semi-continuous payoffs
Counterexample showing non-existence without lower-semi-continuity
Complements previous work by Solan and Vieille (2003)
Abstract
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect -equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect -equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Advanced Topology and Set Theory · Game Theory and Applications
