Luhmann's Communication-Theoretical Specification of the 'Genomena' of Husserl's Phenomenology

TL;DR

This paper explores Luhmann's communication theory in sociology, framing it as a meta-biology that emphasizes meaning processing as a cultural given, distinct from communication itself, with implications for understanding phenomenology and metaphysics.

Contribution

It offers a novel interpretation of Luhmann's approach as a meta-biology, connecting it with Husserl's phenomenology and critiquing metaphysical issues in meaning processing.

Findings

Luhmann's theory treats meaning development as a cultural given.

It distinguishes psychic and social systems in communication.

The critique highlights the scientistic objectivation of meaning.

Abstract

From the perspective of cultural studies and critical theory, Luhmann's communication-theoretical approach in sociology can still be read as a meta-biology: while biologists take the development of life as a given, Luhmann tends to treat the development of meaning as a cultural given. Meaning is no longer considered as constructed in communication, but meaning processing precedes and controls communication as an independent variable. Habermas appreciates Luhmann's distinction between psychic and social systems, but he challenges us to bring the critique of metaphysical issues (of providing meaning to events in a dialectics) back into this metabiological perspective that processes meaning without intentionality, that is, as a scientistic objectivation.