The Complexity of Iterated Strategy Elimination
Arno Pauly
TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of iterated strategy elimination in games, analyzing how different domination definitions, payoff diversity, and game restrictions affect eliminability.
Contribution
It provides a detailed complexity analysis of strategy elimination under various conditions, including different domination notions and game types.
Findings
Complexity varies with domination definitions.
Payoff value diversity impacts eliminability.
Constant-sum games have specific complexity characteristics.
Abstract
We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a certain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different definitions of domination and of the number of different payoff values. In addition, the consequence of restriction to constant-sum games is shown.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Artificial Intelligence in Games · Game Theory and Voting Systems