Prisoner's Dilemma with Semi-synchronous Updates: Evidence for a First Order Phase Transition
M Ali Saif, P. M. Gade

TL;DR
This paper investigates how semi-synchronous updates in the prisoner's dilemma influence cooperation emergence, revealing a first order phase transition from defection to cooperation, with implications for understanding natural systems.
Contribution
It introduces a semi-synchronous update model for prisoner's dilemma and demonstrates a first order phase transition, advancing the understanding of cooperation dynamics.
Findings
Identified a first order phase transition in cooperation levels
Observed a transition from all-defector to mixed states as a function of update probability
Demonstrated the transition as a frozen-chaotic transition using damage spreading
Abstract
Emergence of cooperation in self-centered individuals has been a major puzzle in the study of evolutionary ethics. Reciprocal altruism is one of explanations put forward and prisoner's dilemma has been a paradigm in this context. Emergence of cooperation was demonstrated for prisoner's dilemma on a lattice with synchronous update [Nature, 359, 826 (1992)]. However, the cooperation disappeared for asynchronous update and the general validity of the conclusions was questioned [PNAS, 90, 7716 (1993)]. Neither synchronous nor asynchronous updates are realistic for natural systems. In this paper, we make a detailed study of more realistic system of semi-synchronous updates where pN agents are updated at every time instant. We observe a transition from all-defector state to a mixed state as a function of p. Despite being transition from absorbing state, our studies indicate that it is a first…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
