Stackelberg Pricing is Hard to Approximate within $2-\epsilon$
Parinya Chalermsook, Bundit Laekhanukit, Danupon Nanongkai

TL;DR
This paper proves that approximating Stackelberg Pricing for shortest paths within a factor of 2 minus epsilon is computationally hard, improving previous hardness results and revealing the problem's intrinsic difficulty.
Contribution
It establishes a tighter hardness of approximation for the shortest path Stackelberg Pricing problem, advancing understanding of its computational complexity.
Findings
Proves hardness of approximation within 2 - epsilon
Improves upon previous APX-hardness results
Introduces new insights into price structure and instance hardness
Abstract
Stackelberg Pricing Games is a two-level combinatorial pricing problem studied in the Economics, Operation Research, and Computer Science communities. In this paper, we consider the decade-old shortest path version of this problem which is the first and most studied problem in this family. The game is played on a graph (representing a network) consisting of {\em fixed cost} edges and {\em pricable} or {\em variable cost} edges. The fixed cost edges already have some fixed price (representing the competitor's prices). Our task is to choose prices for the variable cost edges. After that, a client will buy the cheapest path from a node to a node , using any combination of fixed cost and variable cost edges. The goal is to maximize the revenue on variable cost edges. In this paper, we show that the problem is hard to approximate within , improving the previous…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Business Strategy and Innovation
