Minimizing Cache Timing Attack Using Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) Algorithm

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm, a software-based method to prevent cache timing attacks on Rijndael (AES), ensuring encryption occurs at a constant time for enhanced security.

Contribution

The paper proposes a novel DCF algorithm that effectively mitigates cache timing attacks on Rijndael by maintaining constant-time encryption, improving security measures.

Findings

DCF algorithm encrypts at a constant time

Enhanced security against cache timing attacks

Simulation shows improved protection for Rijndael

Abstract

Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein devised a cache timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.