State Space Reduction with Message Inspection in Security Protocol Model Checking
Stylianos Basagiannis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Andrew Pombortsis

TL;DR
This paper introduces a Message Inspection technique that reduces the state space in security protocol model checking by preemptively eliminating infeasible attack paths based on metadata, improving analysis efficiency.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel Message Inspection algorithm that leverages message metadata to prune infeasible attack scenarios, enhancing model checking of security protocols.
Findings
Significant reduction in state space during model checking
Effective identification and removal of infeasible attack paths
Improved efficiency in analyzing complex security protocols
Abstract
Model checking is a widespread automatic formal analysis that has been successful in discovering flaws in security protocols. However existing possibilities for state space explosion still hinder analyses of complex protocols and protocol configurations. Message Inspection, is a technique that delimits the branching of the state space due to the intruder model without excluding possible attacks. In a preliminary simulation, the intruder model tags the eavesdropped messages with specific metadata that enable validation of feasibility of possible attack actions. The Message Inspection algorithm then decides based on these metadata, which attacks will certainly fail according to known security principles. Thus, it is a priori known that i.e. an encryption scheme attack cannot succeed if the intruder does not posses the right key in his knowledge. The simulation terminates with a report of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Authentication Protocols Security · User Authentication and Security Systems · Formal Methods in Verification
