On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions
Yossi Azar, Benjamin Birnbaum, Anna R. Karlin, C. Thach Nguyen

TL;DR
This paper studies the computational complexity of revenue maximization in second-price ad auctions, revealing significant hardness results and providing approximation algorithms for the problem.
Contribution
It introduces the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, analyzes its complexity, and offers approximation algorithms contrasting with first-price auction models.
Findings
Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is NP-hard to approximate.
Offline 2PM is APX-hard, online 2PM has no non-trivial deterministic algorithms.
Provides a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive online algorithm.
Abstract
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem to any non-trivial factor. Second, this discrepancy extends even to the 0-1 special case that we call the Second-Price…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
