A Differential Cryptanalysis of Yen-Chen-Wu Multimedia Cryptography System (MCS)

TL;DR

This paper introduces a differential cryptanalysis attack on the Yen-Chen-Wu Multimedia Cryptography System (MCS), demonstrating vulnerabilities with only seven chosen plaintexts and linear complexity, highlighting security concerns.

Contribution

It provides the first cryptanalytic analysis of MCS, revealing its susceptibility to differential attacks and exposing security weaknesses in the system.

Findings

Differential attack requires only seven chosen plaintexts

Attack complexity is linear in plaintext size

Experimental results confirm the effectiveness of the attack

Abstract

At ISCAS'2005, Yen et al. presented a new chaos-based cryptosystem for multimedia transmission named "Multimedia Cryptography System" (MCS). No cryptanalytic results have been reported so far. This paper presents a differential attack to break MCS, which requires only seven chosen plaintexts. The complexity of the attack is O(N), where $N$ is the size of plaintext. Experimental results are also given to show the real performance of the proposed attack.