On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

TL;DR

This paper models and analyzes the strategic interactions of wireless devices choosing base stations, revealing multiple equilibria in selection but a unique equilibrium in sharing, with implications for network efficiency and a paradoxical performance outcome.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for base station selection and sharing, proving the existence of potential games and analyzing their equilibria and efficiency.

Findings

BS sharing has a unique Nash equilibrium.

BS selection has multiple Nash equilibria.

Performance depends on the number of transmitters, with potential for a paradoxical outcome.

Abstract

We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in two different scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE) while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, we observed that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selection technique might provide a better global performance (network spectral efficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.