Vulnerability analysis of three remote voting methods
Chantal Enguehard (LINA), R\'emi Lehn (LINA)

TL;DR
This paper compares vulnerabilities of postal, internet, and hybrid remote voting methods, highlighting how automation and digitalization shift from visible to more widespread but less apparent security risks.
Contribution
It provides a systematic vulnerability analysis of three remote voting methods, considering multiple security criteria and quantifying vulnerabilities by size, visibility, and difficulty.
Findings
Automation increases invisible vulnerabilities
Digitalization shifts vulnerabilities from visible to widespread
Hybrid voting has unique security trade-offs
Abstract
This article analyses three methods of remote voting in an uncontrolled environment: postal voting, internet voting and hybrid voting. It breaks down the voting process into different stages and compares their vulnerabilities considering criteria that must be respected in any democratic vote: confidentiality, anonymity, transparency, vote unicity and authenticity. Whether for safety or reliability, each vulnerability is quantified by three parameters: size, visibility and difficulty to achieve. The study concludes that the automatisation of treatments combined with the dematerialisation of the objects used during an election tends to substitute visible vulnerabilities of a lesser magnitude by invisible and widespread vulnerabilities.
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Taxonomy
TopicsNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
