On the Duality of Probing and Fault Attacks

TL;DR

This paper explores the duality between probing and fault attacks in cryptographic circuits, introducing a formal framework that unifies privacy and integrity protection through coding theory, and proposes new tamper-resistant codes.

Contribution

It introduces a formal information-theoretic framework linking probing and fault security, and develops new linear tamper-resistant codes for enhanced cryptographic protection.

Findings

Unified framework for probing and fault security based on coding theory

Optimal secret sharing schemes derived from properties of linear codes

Introduction of new linear tamper-resistant codes for combined attack resistance

Abstract

In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and fault security is introduced, which is directly related to the capabilities of a realistic attacker. In order to investigate the interrelation of probing and fault security we introduce a common mathematical framework based on the formalism of information and coding theory. The framework unifies the known linear masking schemes. We proof a central theorem about the properties of linear codes which leads to optimal secret sharing schemes. These schemes provide the lower bound for the number of masks needed to counteract an attacker with a given strength. The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality principle between the problems of probing and fault security, and provides a unified view on privacy and integrity protection using error detecting codes. Finally, we introduce a new class of linear tamper-resistant codes. These are eligible to preserve security against an attacker mounting simultaneous probing and fault attacks.