Partner selections in public goods games with constant group size
Te Wu, Feng Fu, Long Wang

TL;DR
This study investigates how fixed group sizes, determined by social institutions, influence cooperation in public goods games, revealing that reputation-based partner selection can significantly enhance cooperative behavior.
Contribution
The paper introduces a model of public goods games with fixed group sizes and heterogeneous social ties, analyzing degree-based and reputation-based partner selection mechanisms.
Findings
Reputation-based partner selection improves cooperation.
Stationary density of cooperators depends monotonically on group size.
Different selection regimes show distinct effects over parameter ranges.
Abstract
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social institutions, affects the evolution of cooperation is still unclear. We propose a model where individuals with heterogeneous social ties might well engage in differing numbers of Public Goods Games, yet with each Public Goods Game being constant size during the course of evolution. To do this, we assume that each focal individual unidirectionally selects a constant number of interaction partners from his immediate neighbors with probabilities proportional to the degrees or the reputations of these neighbors, corresponding to degree-based partner selection or reputation-based partner selection, respectively. Because of the stochasticity the group formation is…
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