Learning Equilibria in Games by Stochastic Distributed Algorithms
Olivier Bournez, Johanne Cohen

TL;DR
This paper introduces stochastic distributed algorithms that learn equilibria in games, proving their convergence to Nash equilibria in certain classes of games using mean-field limits and Lyapunov functions.
Contribution
It establishes the convergence of fully stochastic, distributed algorithms to equilibria in games by linking them to mean-field ODEs and Lyapunov functions, including potential and Lyapunov games.
Findings
Stochastic algorithms converge to Nash equilibria in potential games.
Lyapunov functions serve as super-martingales, providing convergence bounds.
Applicable to load balancing and congestion games.
Abstract
We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak convergence for probabilistic processes) towards their mean-field limit, i.e an ordinary differential equation (ODE) in the general case. We focus then on a class of stochastic dynamics where this ODE turns out to be related to multipopulation replicator dynamics. Using facts known about convergence of this ODE, we discuss the convergence of the initial stochastic dynamics: For general games, there might be non-convergence, but when convergence of the ODE holds, considered stochastic algorithms converge towards Nash equilibria. For games admitting Lyapunov functions, that we call Lyapunov games, the stochastic dynamics converge. We prove that any…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
