How discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria?
Arno Pauly

TL;DR
This paper examines how sensitive various game theory solution concepts, including Nash, pure, and correlated equilibria, are to small changes in game data, providing insights into their stability and continuity properties.
Contribution
It offers a detailed analysis of the discontinuity levels of multiple equilibrium concepts in two-player games, extending results to n-player scenarios and solving related linear inequality systems.
Findings
Nash equilibria exhibit significant discontinuity in certain cases
Pure and correlated equilibria also show notable discontinuity behavior
The discontinuity degree of solving linear inequalities is characterized
Abstract
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally, we restrict the treatment to two player games, but results and proofs extend to the n-player case. As a side result, the degree of discontinuity of solving systems of linear inequalities is settled.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models
