A Novel Bid Optimizer for Sponsored Search Auctions based on Cooperative Game Theory
Sriram Somanchi, Chaitanya Nittala, Narahari Yadati

TL;DR
This paper introduces a cooperative game theory-based bid optimizer for sponsored search auctions that improves advertiser retention and utilities without reducing search engine revenue.
Contribution
It presents a novel algorithm using Nash bargaining and nucleolus concepts to generate fair, correlated bid profiles integrated into GSP auctions.
Findings
Retains more advertisers compared to standard GSP.
Yields higher long-term utilities for search engines and advertisers.
Produces a locally envy-free and correlated equilibrium bid profile.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a bid optimizer for sponsored keyword search auctions which leads to better retention of advertisers by yielding attractive utilities to the advertisers without decreasing the revenue to the search engine. The bid optimizer is positioned as a key value added tool the search engine provides to the advertisers. The proposed bid optimizer algorithm transforms the reported values of the advertisers for a keyword into a correlated bid profile using many ideas from cooperative game theory. The algorithm is based on a characteristic form game involving the search engine and the advertisers. Ideas from Nash bargaining theory are used in formulating the characteristic form game to provide for a fair share of surplus among the players involved. The algorithm then computes the nucleolus of the characteristic form game since we find that the nucleolus is an apt way of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Auction Theory and Applications · Digital Platforms and Economics
