Attacking an OT-Based Blind Signature Scheme
Stylianos Basagiannis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Andrew Pombortsis

TL;DR
This paper presents a practical attack on an OT-based blind signature scheme exploiting partial MITM behavior, demonstrating communication corruption, and proposes a fix to enhance security.
Contribution
It introduces a novel attack method on an existing blind signature scheme and provides a security fix to prevent such vulnerabilities.
Findings
The attack can corrupt protocol communication with minimal computational effort.
The attack exploits specific-range random number generation and partial MITM behavior.
A proposed solution effectively mitigates the identified security flaw.
Abstract
In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the Oblivious-Transfer-based blind signatures scheme, proposed in [1]. An attacker with a primitive capability of producing specific-range random numbers, while exhibiting a partial MITM behavior, is able to corrupt the communication between the protocol participants. The attack is quite efficient as it leads to a protocol communication corruption and has a sound-minimal computational cost. We propose a solution to fix the security flaw.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Advanced Authentication Protocols Security · User Authentication and Security Systems
