On Defining 'I' "I logy"

TL;DR

This paper explores the philosophical question of defining 'I', concluding that under certain generalized notions of definability, a precise definition is impossible, and discusses the resulting paradoxes.

Contribution

It introduces a generalized framework for definability and demonstrates how paradoxes challenge the concept of defining 'I' within this framework.

Findings

No definitive 'I' under certain conditions

A paradox arises challenging property and definability concepts

Modifications to definability notions are necessary

Abstract

Could we define I? Throughout this article we give a negative answer to this question. More exactly, we show that there is no definition for I in a certain way. But this negative answer depends on our definition of definability. Here, we try to consider sufficient generalized definition of definability. In the middle of paper a paradox will arise which makes us to modify the way we use the concept of property and definability.