Atomism versus Holism in Science and Philosophy

TL;DR

This paper critically examines atomism and holism in science and philosophy, highlighting how quantum entanglement challenges classical atomistic views and supports a relational, holistic metaphysics.

Contribution

It analyzes Lewis' Humean supervenience, demonstrating its limitations in light of quantum mechanics and proposing a relational metaphysics as a more accurate framework.

Findings

Quantum entanglement violates supervenience principles.

Humean supervenience cannot account for non-supervenient quantum relations.

A relational metaphysics is necessary for understanding the natural world.

Abstract

The pros and cons of various forms of atomism and holism that are applicable both in physical science and today's philosophy of nature are evaluated. To this end, Lewis' thesis of Humean supervenience is presented as an important case study of an atomistic doctrine in philosophical thought. According to the thesis of Humean supervenience, the world is fragmented into local matters of particular fact and everything else supervenes upon them in conjunction with the spatiotemporal relations among them. It is explicitly shown that Lewis' ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, it is argued that contemporary physical science posits non-supervenient relations over and above the spatiotemporal ones. It is demonstrated that the relation of quantum entanglement constitutes the prototypical example of a holistic, irreducible physical relation that does not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, undermining, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. It is concluded, in this respect, that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis' Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that - due to the undeniable existence of generic non-supervenient relations - a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level.