Interference Relay Channels - Part II: Power Allocation Games

TL;DR

This paper analyzes power allocation games in multi-band interference relay channels, proving the existence of Nash equilibria and exploring Stackelberg game models with relay optimization.

Contribution

It extends previous work by modeling multi-band IRCs, establishing equilibrium existence, and incorporating relay parameter optimization in a Stackelberg game framework.

Findings

Concave power allocation games guarantee pure Nash equilibria.

Relay optimization as a leader influences source power strategies.

Simulations provide insights into game dynamics and equilibrium behavior.

Abstract

In the first part of this paper we have derived achievable transmission rates for the (single-band) interference relay channel (IRC) when the relay implements either the amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward or estimate-and-forward protocol. Here, we consider wireless networks that can be modeled by a multi-band IRC. We tackle the existence issue of Nash equilibria (NE) in these networks where each information source is assumed to selfishly allocate its power between the available bands in order to maximize its individual transmission rate. Interestingly, it is possible to show that the three power allocation (PA) games (corresponding to the three protocols assumed) under investigation are concave, which guarantees the existence of a pure NE after Rosen [3]. Then, as the relay can also optimize several parameters e.g., its position and transmit power, it is further considered as the leader of a Stackelberg game where the information sources are the followers. Our theoretical analysis is illustrated by simulations giving more insights on the addressed issues.