TL;DR
This paper investigates the selfish bin covering problem, analyzing how lack of coordination affects social welfare through various equilibrium concepts and their efficiency metrics.
Contribution
It introduces new equilibrium concepts and evaluates their impact on social welfare, extending traditional PoA and PoS analyses in the context of selfish bin covering.
Findings
PoA and PoS bounds for Nash and strong Nash equilibria
Complexity results for computing and approximating equilibria
Comparison of social welfare across different equilibrium types
Abstract
In this paper, we address the selfish bin covering problem, which is greatly related both to the bin covering problem, and to the weighted majority game. What we mainly concern is how much the lack of coordination harms the social welfare. Besides the standard PoA and PoS, which are based on Nash equilibrium, we also take into account the strong Nash equilibrium, and several other new equilibria. For each equilibrium, the corresponding PoA and PoS are given, and the problems of computing an arbitrary equilibrium, as well as approximating the best one, are also considered.
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