A Constructive Generalization of Nash Equilibrium for Better Payoffs and Stability
Xiaofei Huang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a constructive generalization of Nash equilibrium allowing individuals to reduce selfishness levels, leading to better payoffs and increased societal stability, supported by experimental and theoretical analysis.
Contribution
It proposes a new framework for equilibria in n-person games that accounts for varying selfishness levels and provides a protocol for society to reach more beneficial and stable outcomes.
Findings
Individuals can lower selfishness to reach better equilibria
Reduced selfishness leads to higher collective payoffs
Society becomes more stable with controlled selfishness levels
Abstract
In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody would benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy. Nash Equilibrium is a central concept in game theory, which offers a mathematical foundation for social science and economy. However, it is important from both a theoretical and a practical point of view to understand game playing where individuals are less selfish. This paper offers a constructive generalization of Nash equilibrium to study n-person games where the selfishness of individuals can be defined at any level, including the extreme of complete selfishness. The generalization is constructive since it offers a protocol for individuals in a society to reach an equilibrium. Most…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
