On the security and degradability of Gaussian channels
Stefano Pirandola, Samuel L. Braunstein, and Seth Lloyd

TL;DR
This paper investigates the security of Gaussian channels in quantum cryptography by analyzing canonical attacks, their relation to degradability, and connections to optimal Gaussian cloning, providing insights into channel vulnerabilities.
Contribution
It introduces the concept of canonical attacks for Gaussian channels and explores their impact on security and degradability in quantum key distribution.
Findings
Canonical attacks relate to channel degradability.
Degradability influences quantum key distribution security.
Relations between canonical attacks and Gaussian cloning are established.
Abstract
We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
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Taxonomy
TopicsChaos-based Image/Signal Encryption · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · Wireless Communication Security Techniques
