Introducing Hierarchy in Energy Games
S. Lasaulce, Y. Hayel, R. El Azouzi, and M. Debbah

TL;DR
This paper explores how introducing hierarchy in wireless energy games, through Stackelberg leadership and successive interference cancellation, enhances individual and network-wide energy efficiency and stabilizes equilibria.
Contribution
It presents novel hierarchical game formulations for energy-efficient power control, demonstrating improvements over non-hierarchical approaches.
Findings
Hierarchy improves individual energy efficiency.
Hierarchy can ensure the existence of non-saturated equilibria.
Hierarchy balances global network performance and signaling complexity.
Abstract
In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInnovation Diffusion and Forecasting
