On Competing Wireless Service Providers
Vojislav Gajic (1), Jianwei Huang (2), Bixio Rimoldi (1) ((1) EPFL,, (2) CUHK)

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the competition between wireless service providers with heterogeneous users, proving the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and showing that two providers' competition can lead to globally optimal outcomes.
Contribution
It establishes the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in a competitive wireless market with heterogeneous users and extends results to multiple providers.
Findings
Two-provider competition leads to globally optimal outcomes.
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under generic channel models.
Numerical examples illustrate parameter effects on equilibrium.
Abstract
We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the competition of two service providers, for a generic channel model. Interestingly, the competition of two providers leads to a globally optimal outcome. We extend some of the results to the case where more than two providers are competing. Finally, we provide numerical examples that illustrate the effects of various parameters on the Nash equilibrium.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsCooperative Communication and Network Coding · Advanced Wireless Network Optimization · ICT Impact and Policies
