Patterns of cooperation: fairness and coordination in networks of interacting agents

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how self-interested agents self-organize cooperation in networks, leading to coordinated investments and benefits, while some agents gain privileged positions, explaining observed asymmetric collaborations.

Contribution

It provides an analytical framework showing how agents' adaptive investments lead to coordinated network structures and explains the emergence of asymmetric collaborations.

Findings

Agents tend to make identical investments and benefits in equilibrium.

Some agents secure privileged positions with higher payoffs.

The model explains unidirectional collaborations and responses to partner withdrawal.

Abstract

We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently adapt the amount of resources allocated to each of their collaborations in order to maximize the obtained payoff. We show analytically that the system approaches a state in which the agents make identical investments, and links produce identical benefits. Despite this high degree of social coordination some agents manage to secure privileged topological positions in the network enabling them to extract high payoffs. Our analytical investigations provide a rationale for the emergence of unidirectional non-reciprocal collaborations and different responses to the withdrawal of a partner from an interaction that have been reported in the psychological literature.