Non-factorizable Joint Probabilities and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma Game

TL;DR

This paper explores how quantum strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma can lead to a non-classical evolutionarily stable strategy, contrasting with previous findings that classical NE remains dominant.

Contribution

It demonstrates the emergence of a non-classical ESS in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma, expanding understanding of quantum game theory beyond classical equilibria.

Findings

Non-classical ESS identified in quantum PD

Classical NE remains the unique solution in earlier schemes

Quantum correlations influence stability of strategies

Abstract

The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD.