Dynamic spectrum sharing game by lease

TL;DR

This paper introduces a dynamic spectrum leasing model where primary users lease spectrum to secondary networks, using game theory to optimize cooperation and competition, with promising results for fair spectrum sharing.

Contribution

It presents a novel dynamic game-theoretic framework for spectrum leasing with both complete and incomplete information models, including algorithms for practical implementation.

Findings

The models enable fair spectrum sharing between primary and secondary networks.

Algorithms achieve near-optimal cooperation and competition balance.

Numerical results demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Abstract

We propose and analyze a dynamic implementation of the property-rights model of cognitive radio. A primary link has the possibility to lease the owned spectrum to a MAC network of secondary nodes, in exchange for cooperation in the form of distributed space-time coding (DSTC). The cooperation and competition between the primary and secondary network are cast in the framework of sequential game. On one hand, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service in terms of signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR); on the other hand, nodes in the secondary network compete for transmission within the leased time-slot following a power control mechanism. We consider both a baseline model with complete information and a more practical version with incomplete information, using the backward induction approach for the former and providing approximate algorithm for the latter. Analysis and numerical results show that our models and algorithms provide a promising framework for fair and effective spectrum sharing, both between primary and secondary networks and among secondary nodes.